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Book Review
SOCIAL THEORY AT A CROSSROADS. By William Leon McBride. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1980. Pp. ix, 171.

"Most thought provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are
still not thinking [and so] every moment the crossroad moves along with
us"-Heidegger
Social Theory At A Crossroads is a revision of four lectures
delivered at Duquesne University where McBride had a forum for
elaborating his programmatic and highly personal assessment of our
cultural crisis in general as well as its manifestations in political-social
theory in particular. By our cultural crisis McBride means "primarily
American, secondarily Western European, and finally global cultures
that American and Western European cultures have played a role in
defining."1 He regards political-social theory as a species of cultural intellectuality, and it is this intellectuality itself, the sine qua non of
culture, that McBride finds to be flawed. This is so because certain
features of our culture promote truncated intellectuality, an intellectuality that is neither comprehensive nor critical, ie., neither selfcritical nor critical of its contemplated objects.' As one illustration of
his thesis, McBride observes that our culture fanatically pursues only
what it regards as practical and so it demands the same from its intellectuality. Accordingly, intellectual life in America suffers from an
absence of reflection upon the past, a kind of historical amnesia.' Our
culture, dancing as it must to the tune of the marketplace, allows
historical memory to exist only through such modalities as, for example, nostalgic fads which offer commercial possibilities. Professor
McBride is alarmed by the inferior role-indeed, nonexistent role at
times-that historical reflection performs in both graduate and
undergraduate levels of the humanities and the political-social sciences.
Historical knowledge is grudgingly tolerated, but more frequently it is
thought to be a waste of time, a luxury that practitioners of specialized
and pragmatic expertise can ill afford. This guild mentality, supported
as it is by the Anglo-American domination of philosophical positivism,
as

1. WILLIAM MCBRIDE, SOCIAL THEORY AT A CROSSROADS
MCBRIDE].

117 (1980) [hereinafter cited

2. McBride opines that Herber Marcuse's One Dimensional Man: Studies in the
Ideology of Advanced Idustrial Society (1964), stands as an inadequate but nevertheless
worthy example of comprehensive and critical thought. McBRIDE, supra note 1, at 120.
Comprehensive intellectuality must embrace methodological, descriptive, and normative
elements in dialectical tension. Id. at 4.
3. MCBRIDE, supra note 1, at 117-51.
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utilitarianism, and pragmatism, has repressed historical consciousness
and has thereby devastated political-social theory.4 McBride remarks,
with a modicum of hope, that only Continental-European philosophy-phenomenology, Marxism, and existentialism-have kept alive
historical consciousness through their struggle to generate serious
philosophies of history.
Not only does McBride see our intellectuality as truncated by lack of
historical comprehensiveness, but he also finds it to be a shallow intellectuality failing to push its way into the roots of human existence
where human experience is grounded in its fullness. Succinctly put, our
intellectuality fails to be sufficiently radical.5 McBride suggests that
this feature of our intellectuality derives from our uncritical acceptance of the "dominance of . . . the concept of economic value . . .
within our society, [as] the fundamental form of value."6 Accordingly,
intellectuality becomes a slick, bottomline, manipulative, and
managerial mode of thinking which accepts economic reality as the controlling reality and thereby lets this value transform all other
values-aesthetic, religious, ethical, and philosophical-into commodities whose essences are bastardized into mere appearances of
themselves. McBride acknowledges that in his analysis he is indebted
to Karl Marx who interpreted the modern world by utilizing the concept of "fetishism of commodities."' That approach, says McBride:
enables us to understand better why certain types of human activities
wax and others wane or become suppressed within our culture, on the
basis of the perceived centrality of the contribution that they make or fail
to make to our complex modern system of commodity exchange, rather
than on the basis of their value for human existence. For instance,
Marx's approach enables us to comprehend the present decline in liberal
education, which is considered comparatively irrelevant for the preparation of persons suitable for work in the more technologically advanced
areas of contemporary culture, and might even prove counterproductive if
it gives them "strange" ideas. The same approach enables us to understand why services such as health and transportation ... are skewed in
our culture in the grotesque ways that they are: toward the huge and
often overbuilt hospital plants, toward gigantic and costly airplanes with
high fuel consumption, toward an appallingly wasteful private-automobile
industry, which becomes increasingly entrenched as alternative forms of
transport are cut off. These are some of the commodity fetishisms, the
sacrificing of human needs and values to the needs of the dominant
4. McBride laments that it is now well known that "Wittgenstein . . . read his
classics more or less on the sly." I. at 118.
5. McBride employs the word "critical"; but the word "radical," which in Latin
means "going to the roots," coincides with his intention.
6. Id at 126.
7. Id.
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economic system, that we can understand better once we grasp the broadly Marxian approach to social explanation that I have been outlining.8
This philosophical interpretation is certainly not new to students of
Nietzsche or Heidegger, both of whom reflected deeply upon the
paradox of the simultaneous fulfillment and exhaustion of the GrecoRoman, Judeo-Christian tradition in its contemporary secular
manifestations of technology, business, and economics. What is
refreshing is that Professor McBride appropriates this philosophical
framework to assist him in arriving at an understanding of the contemporary crisis at the heart of his own discipline of political-social
thought. That discipline, like Western culture itself, he finds also to be
impregnated with provincial (ahistorical) and shallow intellectuality.
These elements of McBride's criticism of political-social theory can now
be set forth.
After a brisk survey of the recognized and authoritative AngloAmerican literature constituting the bulk of political-social theory from
approximately 1945 to the present, McBride concludes that a deep rift
separates political-social theorists. On the one side stand the empirical
theorists; on the other, the normative theorists, namely, those
theorists with a strong philosophical predilection. It cannot be denied
that the majority of political-social theorists are, of course, the empirical data-gatherers. They are the ones who "accept certain methodological procedures as canonical for certain purposes, and simply . . .
refuse to engage in any philosophical questioning of presuppostions."9
It is this refusal of the empiricists to examine their own foundational
presuppositions which calls forth McBride's strongest polemic. He
suspects that the concerted refusal of empiricists to examine their
own premises is prompted by the fear that their claim to be "value
free" or "value neutral" is without real ontological foundation. McBride
charges that the empiricists' work product is "frequently and heavily
skewed in the direction of a certain [unexamined] set of political and
social institutions, namely those of American liberal democratic
neocapitalism." 1
In short, empiricists who flaunt their
authoritativesness by sanctimonious appeals to the purported objectivity of their data have uncritically bound Anglo-American political-social
theory to a value-laden liberal democratic framework. This framework
8. Id at 133.
9. Id- at 6.
10. Id. at 10. McBride examines three classical works in order to find evidence of this
uncritical incorporation of a worldview. The works so examined are ROBERT DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); ROBERT LANE, POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: WHY THE
AMERICAN COMMON MAN BELIEVES WHAT HE DOES (1962); and DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951).
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is freighted with unexamined assumptions concerning human nature
and society, assumptions which Continental European philosophy has
been critically asessing and has found to be philosophically deficient,
rooted as it is in a Cartesian worldview reaching its zenith in the skepticism of Hume and his positivist defenders. This state of affairs, the
empiricists, has brought about a
philosophical naivet6 of political-social
"crisis of enfeeblement"'1 and a "crisis of disorientation"12 within the
discipline. The enfeeblement of empiricism derives from a lack of
critical thinking vis-a-vis itself and its apprehended objects; the
disorientation is occasioned by isolation from Continental European
philosophical thought, namely, phenomenology, existentialism, and
Marxism.
McBride then utilizes his critique to examine a specific branch of
political-social theory, namely, legal philosophy. This field is presently
occupied by the work product of the stellar trinity of Rawls, Nozick,
and Dworkin. Their respective work products are examined by
McBride in a chapter entitled "Injustices and Wrongs: Toward a New
Emphasis in the Philosophy of Law."' 3 This chapter gives a basic
review of their respective writings and sets out the critical responses
which have so far appeared. McBride concludes that the work of each
is "caught . . . between the philosophical demand for powerful and
broad generalization, on the one hand, and the natural assumption that
a legal philosophy should be rooted in actual legal practices, on the
other."' But the realization of this goal remains quite elusive to the extent that the work of each of these contemporary shapers of legal
philosophy has remained isolated from the comprehensive and critical
depth of Continental European phenomenology, existentialism, and
Marxism. McBride proposes that only when American legal philosophy
studies and critically appropriates the Continental European
philosophical tradition will we then witness the comprehensive and
critical synthesis that was achieved, for example, by Hegel's
Philosophy of Law, which was "simultaneously a political theory, a
theory about morality, a theory about history, a theory about property
and economic exchange, and so on, as well as a theory about law."'"
McBride predicts that only when American political-social and legal
11. MCBRIDE, supra note 1, at 32.
12. Id.
13. Id at 81-116. The magnum opus of each legal philosopher is as follows: RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE. AND UTOPIA
(1974); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
14. MCBRIDE, supra note 1, at 84. This motif, the tension between the concrete and
the abstract, has been explored by Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., in C. MURPHY. MODERN
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1978).
15. McBride at 89.
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philosophers revolt against their unthinking subservience to the AngloAmerican philosophical tradition of positivism, utilitarianism, and
pragmatism will robust theorizing in the grand manner be again possible.1" Precisely here is the choice or crossroads before which politicalsocial theory now stands.
Social Theory At A Crossroads is but one more book among a growing collection of books that have taken our cultural crisis for their central theme.17 Although McBride confesses embarrassment that the
word "crisis" has been monstrously overworked, he nevertheless holds
to his argument that our cultural malaise is real, omnipresent, and
foundational. Attempting to do justice to both concerns -triteness and
reality-McBride rejects the word "crisis" and places us instead at a
"crossroads." This change in metaphor, at least suggests, as is appropriate to McBride's intention, that Western culture now confronts a
choice. In fact, McBride's work is kept from becoming one more intellectual jeremiad to the extent that he does propose an alternative to
our present cultural plight. Yet there are three serious flaws in this
book's presentation.
First, McBride tells us that his book is aimed at "providing a basic
introduction to its subject matter for an audience assumed to be intellectually sophisticated but not universally well informed about social
'
and political thought."18
So taking McBride at his word, one wonders
why McBride expends no effort whatsoever attempting to persuade
those who see no crisis whatsoever in Western culture, let alone a
crisis amenable to a Marxist analysis. Surely, McBride intends more
than to preach to the already converted. Second, if McBride desires to
popularize contemporary European philosophy because he thinks it
vital to the survival of Western culture, why are we kept in the dark
as to McBride's criteria for selecting Jean Paul Sartre among contemporary European philosophers? McBride explains only that Sartre's
philosophy has a "singularly important contribution to make to social
16.

Id at 40.

17. See, e.g.,
THEORY

RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (1970); Hwo

(1976); ALVIN

YOL JUNG, THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING (1979); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973). I do not mean to imply by the mere grouping
together of these books that they are all cut from the same cloth. They are not. But the
use, however, of the card catalogue of any reasonably good library will reveal an immense
seam of material waiting to be mined under the title "(The) Crisis in .... " It is essential
for those scholars of the history of ideas to investigate the recent plethora of crisis
literature in order to unearth both the common and the unique themes and proposals
buried in this literature. Only then, can we suggest what the appearance of such
literature means or signifies for Western culture.
18. MCBRIDE, supra note 1, at ix.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 19:615

theory today."19 Europe, however, offers a brilliant array of relevant
thinkers including, for example, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Jaspers,
Scheler, Ricouer, Habermas, and Heidegger. Third, McBride believes
that the direction that Western culture will take is largely dependent
upon the kinds of teachers who staff our educational institutions. This
belief in the salvific efficacy of education remains an assumption of a
liberal democratic Weltanschauung which McBride fails to subject to
criticism.
But despite these three defects of omission, McBride's book is essential reading for those law students, lawyers, and professors of law, who
wish to explore possible connections between philosophy of law and
the larger philosophical currents of the modern world.
Robert D. Taylor
19. Id at 41.
EDITOR*S NOTE: The reviewer is Assistant Professor of Law, Duquesne University
School of Law. B.S., University of Pittsburgh (1960); M. Div., Pittsburgh Theological
Seminary (1963); J.D., Duquesne University School of Law (1979).

